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Abstract
Recently, China’s core national interest proposal has drawn significant attention from
scholars, triggering a wide range of discussions on this interesting phenomenon. However,
the existing literature remains largely limited to single-case studies and has neglected several
crucial questions: What is the major difference between China’s national interest and core
national interest? What factors may cause a transition from a national interest to a core
interest? How can we understand this long-term transition? Based on these questions, this
article constructs a neoclassical-based analytical framework to trace that transition, arguing
that the major difference between these two concepts is the scope of their application.
Meanwhile, the transition in China’s national interest can be categorised as “defensive
national interest,” “constructive national interest,” and “adversary core interest” from the
beginning of the 1980s to 2017 – with the scope expanded accordingly from the domestic
and regional levels to the inter-regional one.
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Introduction
National interest, a basic concept in international politics, is widely regarded as the
basis of a state’s foreign policy (Art, 2004: 45). As a steadily rising power, China’s
behavioural patterns draw significant attention from scholars – and its national interest
has, accordingly, become an important starting point for explaining China’s foreign
policy. Generally, China’s national interests – which mainly include defending sover-
eignty and territorial integrity, maintaining internal stability and political rules, sus-
taining economic growth, and securing China’s status as a great power – have remained
fairly consistent over the past few decades. However, these fixed areas of national
interest have assumed some differences in China’s various stages of rising, largely
relying on the strategic calculation of their perceived significance, external threat per-
ceptions, and China’s own relative capabilities. Some interesting signs can be observed
in the critical junctures of China’s foreign policy.
For example, beginning in the 1980s, then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping reiterated
in several important speeches that economic growth and modernisation were the central
tasks of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government, emphasising that all other
internal and external affairs should serve the primary interest of economic development.
Under Deng’s instruction, China’s foreign policy managed to turn inward – making both
diplomacy and national defence serve domestic economic growth. In the 1990s, while
confronting economic sanctions and the “China threat theory,” Deng proposed the basic
principle of China’s foreign strategy: “Keep a low profile, and do something” (韬光养晦,
有所作为, taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei). This helped China to overcome the
political difficulties brought on by the Tiananmen Square incident. The China threat theory
also made the government realise that simply accumulating material capabilities would
trigger wide-ranging anxiety and that the inherent ideological conflict between China and
democratic countries might escalate such tension. To make other countries accept the CCP-
led rise of China, the Chinese government strived to engage in the US-dominated liberal
order by actively participating in various international institutions and organisations, sig-
nalling that China would act as a rule follower rather than a rule breaker.
Recently, the principle of keeping a low profile has been modified to “strive for
achievement” (奋发有为, fenfa youwei). This is a new term that President Xi Jinping has
used to deal with diplomatic relations, which raise debate over what exactly China wants
to achieve (Legro, 2007). At this stage, China’s objective is more than material capa-
bility accumulation and sharing its increasing dividends. What China currently wants, in
fact, is to be a widely recognised and respected great power with extensive prestige and
influence. To safeguard its great power status, China has started to exhibit assertive
behaviour by defining its control over an increasing number of territories that are in its
national interest – not only those of traditional significance such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and
Taiwan but also some disputed territories such as the South China Sea and East China
Sea, too.
Based on the above observations, it is easy to note that some changes have occurred
in China’s national interest since the 1980s. However, although China’s national interest
has become an increasingly efficient instrument in strategic interactions with other major
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powers, the existing literature remains largely limited to single-case studies rather than
engaging in the systematic and long-term tracking of trends. This is primarily because
existing studies have rarely focused on the following crucial questions: What is the
major difference between China’s national interest and core national interest? What
factors may cause a transition from a national interest to a core interest? How can we
understand this long-term transition?
To answer these key questions, this article – which is based on recent developments in
neoclassical realism – treats the power structure in place as an independent variable, with
two intervening variables – China’s strategic orientation and responses by neighbouring
states – used to construct an analytical framework to trace the transition from a national
interest to a core national interest. While a core interest is inherited from a national
interest, sharing the same fixed contents, the major difference between these two con-
cepts is the scope of their application. Meanwhile, this article further contends that the
changing scope of China’s national interest is determined not only by its rising power
status but also by China’s strategic choices as well as by the responses from neigh-
bouring countries at different stages of development. Relying on the covariation caused
by the three variables, the transition in China’s national interest can be categorised as
defensive national interest, constructive national interest, and adversary core interest
from the 1980s to 2017 – with the scope expanded accordingly from the domestic and
regional levels to the inter-regional one.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: a brief but critical review is given in the
next section, to highlight the inadequacies of the existing literature. The third section,
based on the modified neoclassical realism approach, constructs an analytical framework
to track the long-term transition in China’s national interest. The new analytical
framework is applied so as to trace this transition in China’s national interest and to
illustrate the logic of how such a transition operates, in the fourth section. The research
findings will then be summarised in the concluding section.
The Existing Literature on China’s National Interest
Interestingly, Western scholars do appear to have focused their attention on China’s
national interest. This is partly because recent references to the country’s core national
interest have grown dramatically. According to Figure 1, from 2008 to 2016, the number
of references rapidly increased – reaching its highest point at 309. Data collected by
Xinhua News indicate a more pronounced trend. In line with Figure 2, the maximum
frequency during this period was 938, while the average number was approximately 600.
Additionally, the Chinese government seemingly shows a strong preference for applying
the pursuit of its core national interest to the diplomatic realm (55.5 per cent) – which is
seen as far more important than other realms, such as the economy (15.7 per cent) and the
military (23 per cent) (Zeng, 2017). In this regard, these figures imply that the concept of
core national interest has become a major instrument for interactions with other countries.
This observation is confirmed by growing interest among Western scholars in China’s
core national interest. Three schools of thought, emanating from different analytical
levels, seek to account for China’s core national interest. These are China’s rise
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Figure 1. Number of references to core national interest, as collected by People’s Daily. Source:
People’s Daily Database (2016).
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Figure 2. Number of references to core national interest, as collected by Xinhua News. Source:
Xinhua News Database (2016).
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challenging the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, domestic pressure from
increasing Chinese nationalism, and the transition in Chinese leadership.
First, some scholars posit that the proposal of the core interest is a by-product of
China’s rising power – as the rise of China has changed the existing power structure in
the Asia-Pacific region. China’s challenge to the balance of power has enabled the
country to break free from the constraints produced by the system’s structure, thus
providing space for its strategic choices to shape a more favourable external environment
in this region. As He and Feng (2012: 635) summarise, when a state has growing power,
its interests will enlarge. They further elaborate this argument using two dimensions:
horizontally, China promotes its national interest to focus on protecting its overseas and
security interests, for example, by facilitating a large-scale evacuation from Libya and
sending navy ships and air force planes to disputed territories. Vertically, the Chinese
government consistently insists on sovereignty and territorial integrity issues.
Similarly, Swaine (2011) asserts that the current core interest reflects Beijing’s
growing determination and confidence to safeguard its bottom lines and national security
within a global power struggle with the US. This realist perspective is also supported by
territorial dispute cases between China and its neighbouring countries. Scholars argue
that the range of interest overlaps between China and its neighbouring countries con-
tinues to expand because of its growing power – leading to an increasing number of
maritime disputes. The Chinese government, in turn, must propose what the core interest
is, as such a concept may help achieve diplomatic goals when dealing with territorial
disputes and other sensitive issues (Christensen, 2011; Yoshihara and Holmes, 2011).
Relative capability is undoubtedly the most important factor in international politics,
one which enables China to change the distribution of existing power configurations to
create more space for its expanding national interest. However, the realist logic neglects
the fact that growing power will not only lead to change in its distribution but also may
invite balancing behaviours from other countries, too. This means that if we solely
attribute China’s expanding national interest to its increasing power, the analysis is likely
to be divorced from the country’s own important strategic calculations – because
avoiding the anti-China alliance is always a top priority of its foreign policy. In this vein,
China’s expanding national interest should be limited by its strategic interactions with
other countries rather than be a simple result of growing power. Indeed, some studies
also illustrate that the Chinese government has applied a mixed approach – using both
reassurance and coercion strategies in dealing with maritime disputes, rather than simply
making an “either/or” choice (Zhou, 2016).
The second school of thought emphasises the role of Chinese nationalism and spe-
cifically the pressure it generates on the Chinese government to take a more assertive
stance in its foreign policy so as to appease the nationalist sentiment of domestic
audiences. Therefore, the national core interest underlying Chinese foreign policy is
widely regarded by nationalists as being assertive externally. This correlation is
explained by William Callahan (2004), who contends that the humiliation and salvation
of the nineteenth century produced a strong sense of national insecurity that became the
main driving force of rising Chinese nationalism. This viewpoint has been further
developed by various other scholars, with the general academic consensus being that
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Chinese nationalism – especially the radical and irrational variety boosted by patriotic
education in the 1990s – has become the major domestic driving force shaping China’s
foreign behaviour – including regarding the promotion of the concept of China’s national
core interest (Hughes, 2006; Weiss, 2014; Zhao, 2013b).
However, this explanation suffers from two obvious problems. First, it neglects the
fact that the Chinese government indeed has the power to control and appease radical
and irrational nationalist sentiment when it reaches an agreement to restore bilateral
relations. The rapid appeasement and recovery regarding China–South Korea relations
after the latter’s deployment of a US missile system is one such case. Second, this
explanation overestimates nationalism as an independent force in influencing Chinese
foreign policy. According to empirical studies by scholars, there is no robust evidence
for the rise of Chinese nationalism – which means that such sentiment may not have any
correlation with the transition in national interest occurring (Johnston, 2017). Identifying
problems in the nationalist argument is not to deny its importance in shaping Chinese
foreign behaviour, and such sentiment is indeed regarded as a supplement to the CCP’s
legitimacy. However, it is not the major source hereof – since economic growth, at least
before completing the construction of a moderately prosperous society (小康社会,
xiaokang shehui), still plays a leading role in determining the CCP’s political trajec-
tories. Additionally, given the government’s ability to control national sentiment, it is
better to argue that nationalism is useful to strengthen domestic cohesion and consensus,
enabling the government to smoothly implement its chosen foreign policy.
The third scholarly explanation relates the change in national interest to the transition in
Chinese leadership. Underlying this explanation are two key perceived dimensions:
strongman politics and the necessity of maintaining regime stability and legitimacy. On the
one hand, there is the view that China’s national interest transition is largely due to the
power transition in Chinese leadership, as President Xi is widely regarded as a stronger,
more assertive leader than Hu Jintao – leading to increasingly aggressive and expansive
foreign behaviour (Economy, 2014). Some scholars have performed operational coding of
the Chinese leadership, finding that an uncompromising stance is preferred when facing a
constrained external environment (He and Feng, 2013; Liao, 2016). On the other hand,
scholars – based on observations of Chinese domestic reality – argue that the proposal of
the national core interest reflects the imperative need of Chinese leaders for stability and
legitimacy. The slowdown in China’s economic growth has the potential to produce great
pressure on the political legitimacy of the CCP (Nathan, 2017; Zhao, 2013a).
These two interpretations are also problematic, however. First, while strongman
politics is useful for clarifying a leader’s personality, preferences, and style, which are
important in studies of foreign policy, it is overly reductionist for researchers to consider
the rotation of leadership as the decisive factor in external behaviour. Foreign policy is a
product of bilateral and multilateral interactions involving the state and the international
system, not merely of personal preferences (Waltz, 1959: Chapters 6 and 7). Second,
although the new definition of China’s national core interest includes internal stability
and the CCP’s political rules, the direct causal relations between the transition in national
interest and the regime’s stability are still unclear.
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I argue that the existing literature does not provide an adequate description and
explanation of China’s changing national interest, because most research avoids a long-
term study of how it has transformed. Alastair Iain Johnston (2013) comprehensively
articulates this problem by stating that recent studies of China’s foreign behaviour focus
excessively on single-case studies, which may lead to analytical deviation and fail to
provide a full picture of the country’s foreign policy. Given this research gap, this article
attempts to construct an analytical framework in which the transition process in China’s
national interest can be traced and explicated.
Neoclassical Realism and the Analytical Framework
In the strict sense, neoclassical realism is not a sui generis theory but instead a theoretical
extension of realist traditions – including classical and structural realism. More partic-
ularly, neoclassical realism is widely considered a response to both the shortcomings of
structural realism and the critiques of realism in general. Therefore, this article must first
identify the logic of structural realism before an analytical framework based on neo-
classical realism can be constructed.
Structural Realist Assumptions About Foreign Policy and Their Problems
For Kenneth N. Waltz (1979) and other structural realists, a differential growth rate – which
over time changes the relative distribution of capabilities between states – is the driving force
in international politics. Based on this theoretical core, structural realism can answer two very
general questions: first, which power distributions are more stable? Most structural realists
agree that a bipolar distribution is the most stable, followed by a balanced multipolar dis-
tribution and unbalanced multipolar distribution (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979). Other
scholars may also agree with the stability of the unipolar system, as derived from Robert
Gilpin (1987) and further developed by William C. Wohlforth (1999).
The second question, meanwhile, is closely related to foreign policy: from among a
range of survival strategies, which ones are states likely to choose – including balancing/
bandwagoning, reward/punishment or other options? In Waltz’s view, structural realism is
a theory to explain reoccurring international outcomes – such as the balance of power –
rather than a diplomatic one that aims to analyse a state’s specific foreign policy. Although
Waltz rigidly distinguishes between the theorisation of international politics and diplomatic
theory, many structural realist scholars have in fact contributed to the broadening of the
scope of structural realism – including Stephen M. Walt’s “balance of threat” and John J.
Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” – to provide a more accurate explanation and predic-
tion of a state’s foreign behaviour. To some extent, structural realism is also called a
“systemic approach” to understanding states’ foreign policy, as they are compelled to
select the most appropriate one in response to systemic circumstances (Ripsman et al.,
2016: 19). Thus, we can also infer a driven systemic approach model as follows:
Systemic Stimuli→Policy Selection
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However, the systemic approach is not without problems. The overemphasis on systemic
stimuli has trapped structural realism into naturalism, ahistoricism, and determinism,
which weakens its explanatory power vis-à-vis dynamic and changing political phe-
nomena – such as the transition in the international system, the US’s loss in the War on
Terror, and the underbalance of China’s rise in the twenty-first century (Kratochwil,
1993; Schweller, 2004). More importantly, a rising power, based on rational calculations,
should not challenge the existing hegemonic power before it accumulates enough power
resources. In this regard, China’s foreign policy should be to keep a low profile because
the relative power gap between it and the US is still huge regardless of the Asian
country’s rapid rise.
However, the changing patterns in China’s foreign behaviour may demonstrate the
fact that it is not only driven by the growth of relative power but also influenced by
other factors, too. The problem with a systemic approach is mainly derived from
structural logic, which is too simplistic for elaborating how complicated strategic
interactions shape a state’s foreign policy. Therefore, the shortcoming of structural
realism illustrates the fact that a states’ foreign policy should not only be determined
by systemic variables but also the other variables that emerge in the process of
strategic decision-making. Based on this understanding, we cannot wholly explain the
transition in China’s national interest by merely following the logic of a systemic
approach.
The Neoclassical Realist-Based Analytical Framework
A state’s foreign policy behaviour is usually shaped by interactions between interna-
tional and domestic factors, rather than merely being determined by international
structures. Nevertheless, a few existing studies have combined different levels of anal-
ysis and developed cross-level theories to elaborate states’ foreign policies and external
behaviours. This is partly because scholars are deeply influenced by Waltz’s systemic
approach, which views analyses at the domestic and individual levels as reductionist. In
dialogue with Waltz, Colin Elman (1996) contends that structural realism neglects the
behavioural patterns of state actors, rendering it unable to predict a given state’s foreign
activities. The resurgence of attention to the state in international political studies
indicates that scholars are increasingly aware of the limitations of structural realism in
accounting for foreign policy, particularly when it undergoes a long-term transition.
Therefore, a powerful theory of foreign policy should emphasise the significance of the
international system and incorporate different variables at the international and domestic
levels (Hobson, 2002).
The growing demand for cross-level foreign policy analysis has motivated scholars
to revise existing International Relations theory, and the rise of neoclassical realism is
a product of this trend. Neoclassical realism contends that foreign policy is affected by
both independent and intervening variables. The international power structure is
viewed as the independent variable, shaping a state’s foreign policy, while domestic
variables are seen as intervening ones that may accelerate or slow down transitions in
foreign policy (Rose, 1998). By treating domestic factors as intervening variables,
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neoclassical realism breaks from structural realism’s embarrassment about change,
rendering the theory operational in empirical studies and useful as a basis for the
prediction of a state’s foreign behaviour. In addition, a focus on domestic factors
facilitates the development of an explanatory framework that can be used to examine a
specific state’s foreign policy (Liu, 2016).
However, neoclassical realist theory has inherent limitations to it. First, based on the
aforementioned discussion, we find that it has utilised various domestic variables –
ranging from political institutions and strategic culture to leaders’ perceptions (Ripsman
et al., 2016: 9–16). This renders the theory relatively diffuse rather than internally
cohesive, similar to structural realism. In fact, some leading neoclassical realists – who
frankly criticise the fact that there is no single neoclassical realist foreign policy theory
but only a diversity of neoclassical realist theories – have recognised this problem
(Lobell et al., 2009: 10). Second, while most neoclassical realists aim to bridge the gap
between the international and the domestic levels, they seemingly neglect interactions
between states – especially with allies or rivals. In political reality, a state’s foreign
policy choices and behaviour are not only determined by international structures and by
own domestic political elements but are also largely shaped by the interplay with other
states.
Fortunately, Liu Feng, a professor in the Department of International Relations at
Nankai University, fills this missing link. Liu (2016) argues that the strategic interactions
occurring within interstate relations will largely impact on states’ foreign policy deci-
sions. Using the regional system (systemic stimuli) as the independent variable, Liu
further indicates that the output of a state’s foreign policy is also largely influenced by
the rising power’s strategic orientations (both internal and external) and its neighbours’
responses – which are defined as two intervening variables in his analytical framework.
These two intervening variables are particularly important for China’s rise because that
country’s approach is to choose between strategic interactions with other great powers
and with its neighbouring countries.
Two major factors lead to such a strategic choice: first, the rise of China occurs within
a unipolar system dominated by the US, which means that China will inevitably face
containment from the most powerful country in the world. Also, other major powers in
the Asia-Pacific region such as India and Japan may co-operate with the US on the
strategic containment of China. Second, as a both sea and land rising power, China has
to deal with many neighbouring countries – including some adjacent major powers and
other middle/small powers. Therefore, maintaining relations with great powers and
surrounding countries simultaneously becomes equally important in China’s foreign
policy. Relatedly, Liu suggests that a state actor may design its foreign policy based on
the calculations about its adversary’s own strategy or make a strategic adjustment after
its adversary makes a move. Liu’s argument is consistent with some scholars’ viewpoint
that strategic interactions between states should be introduced as a level of analysis
(Lake and Powell, 1999: 4). More importantly, such a revision to neoclassical realism
not only fulfils the existing deficiency regarding the interstate level but also reduces the
inconsistent variables produced at the domestic one, too.
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As a diplomatic instrument, China’s national interest is also a result of strategic
interactions. In this vein, tracing the transition in China’s national interest cannot merely
focus on international structures and domestic characteristics; it is also necessary to
seriously consider interstate relations. Following Liu’s theoretical revision of neo-
classical realism, this article constructs an analytical framework that can be used to trace
the transition in China’s national interest. As shown in Figure 3, this analytical frame-
work posits that the transition in China’s national interest is mainly determined by the
power structure, China’s strategic choices, and by the responses from neighbouring
countries. These lead to three types of national interest: defensive, offensive, and
adversary. The relations between the independent and the intervening variables are
summarised in Figure 4, and the analytical framework can be expressed by the following
equation: Power Structure þ China’s Strategic Choice þ Responses from Surrounding
Countries ¼ The Transition in China’s National Interest.
Before the empirical examination of this analytical framework, more specific defi-
nitions of its key concepts and causal mechanisms should be elaborated. In accordance
with neoclassical realism, the power structure in different periods is viewed as the inde-
pendent variable. More specifically, the power structure is primarily defined by the dis-
tribution of capability between the great powers – which can be roughly divided into
multipolar, bipolar, and unipolar. The different types of systemic factors represent the
structural constraints and opportunities facing China when it accumulates power resources.
Neoclassical realism uses various measurements or indicators of a state’s material cap-
abilities, including gross domestic product (GDP), level of annual military expenditure,
size of population and territory, and so forth. Given that a state’s relative power is mainly
determined by material resources, this article employs GDP growth rate and military
expenditure to illustrate China’s changing position within the international power structure.
China’s strategic choice is the first intervening variable in promoting the transition in
its national interest. However, this transition is also mainly decided by the systemic
stimuli from the power structure, which can be categorised as a co-operation model,
reassurance model, and hedging model. First, related to the literature on international
politics, “co-operation” is a strategy in which states voluntarily adjust their policies to
manage their differences and reach a more mutually beneficial outcome (Grieco, 1990:
22). Fravel (2008: 17) develops a more practical concept of co-operation, defined as a
state’s trade concessions in the face of thorny issues – being made so as to improve ties
with adversaries within and beyond the region and because of wanting something
in return, usually assistance to counter a more immediate threat faced. In other words,
co-operation to some extent implies a compromise strategy to earn support and
assistance from other states when one state is confronted by an external threat.
Second, in studies of international conflict, “reassurance” is considered a strategy to
signal benevolent intentions and avoid conflicts (Stein, 1991). Recently, reassurance has
also been defined as a useful strategy to avoid balancing or containment by other middle or
small powers (Sun, 2009). Lebow (2007) highlights more specific approaches to achieving
reassurance, including reciprocity, irrevocable commitment, self-restraint, norms of com-
petition, and limited security regimes. In short, by adopting a reassurance strategy, the
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Chinese government attempts to reshape its image to a benign one so as to alleviate the
fear and anxiety caused by the country’s rapid rise.
Third, one of the main attributes of the “hedging” strategy is that it consists of
counteracting policies. The hedging strategy encompasses engage/resist, balancing/
containment, engagement, co-operation/competition, and so forth (Medeiros, 2005;
Nadkarni, 2010: 45). In other words, the hedging model is a mixed strategy that helps a
state respond in the moment to increasingly complicated situations in its strategic
interactions with great powers and middle/small powers.
Moreover, the rise of a new great power will not be welcomed by all of its neigh-
bouring countries for historical and practical reasons, ones which determine the
responses from these states and are the second intervening variable in shaping China’s
national interest. Traditionally, the mainstream strategies for middle or small powers are
the balancing–bandwagoning dichotomy. However, the increasing complexity of the
regional environment due to power struggles between China and external hegemonic
powers leads these states to make an either/or choice. In this vein, hedging becomes a
middle-of-the-road strategy between balancing and bandwagoning for middle/small
powers, which means that such an approach is not only suitable for great powers but also
a flexible strategic choice available to middle/small powers, too (Kuik, 2008; Roy,
2005). As such, the responses from China’s neighbouring states have included band-
wagoning, hedging, and balancing behaviour. However, related to the historical and
political realities on the ground, outright bandwagoning by a rising power is not com-
mon in international politics because of the uncertainties and risks that these states have
to face. Thus, this article uses “accommodating” to describe the accepting and wel-
coming attitude towards a rising power. Henceforth, the neighbouring states’ responses
are classified as accommodating, hedging, and balancing.
Finally, (1) defensive national interest means that the state’s capability and willingness
to defend its domestic demands, such as political stability and economic development, are
(Independent Variable) (Input)                                                     (Dependent Variable) (Output)
(Strategic Reaction) (Feedback)
Power Structure in 
Different Periods
Transition of 
China’s National 
Interest
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from Surrounding 
States
(Intervening Variables) (Accelerate or Slow Down)
China’s Strategic 
Choice
Figure 4. Relations between variables. Source: Author’s own compilation.
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growing, yet it seeks only to defend – not expand – those interests. Meanwhile, (2)
constructive national interest refers to the state’s attempts to achieve a reassuring outcome
by expanding its own national interest to connect with that of other states. Further, (3)
adversary core interest indicates the state beginning to apply a “two-track approach” in its
foreign policy – that is, it has a growing willingness to use an assertive strategy to resist
the containment pressure exerted by the existing hegemon, but nonetheless still uses the
reassurance strategy towards other major/middle/small powers.
How, then, does a combination of the previous variables influence the transition in
China’s national interest? Or, how can we merge these three groups of factors into a
logical causal mechanism? More specifically, the international power structure is the
decisive factor in shaping China’s strategic preferences. Both constraints and opportu-
nities included in the power structure exert a significant impact on China’s objectives or
at least affect the possibility of the country achieving its strategic goals. This will change
China’s intention of using reassurance or coercion towards other countries. According to
China’s strategic choices, the systemic stimuli may be either strengthened or undermined
among its neighbouring countries, influencing their responses to their neighbour’s rise.
In turn, China usually has strong incentives to adopt a relatively co-operative approach
to an accommodating neighbour but is less willing to do that with balancers on its
periphery. Driven by the independent variable and two intervening variables, the scope
of China’s national interest will change accordingly from the domestic level to the inter-
regional one, largely depending on the covariation effect produced by these three
variables. Lastly, the transition in China’s national interest and its expanding scope
become strategic reactions to the international power structure. This formulates a
replicated analytical framework, which will be useful in future studies.
The Transition in China’s National Interest
This section applies the elaborated analytical framework to examine the transition in
China’s national interest and to demonstrate the causal mechanism discussed above. The
study begins with the 1980s, and three phases – 1980s–1990s, 1991–2010, and 2011–
2017 – are included in this process. Meanwhile, as discussed previously, the article
calculates GDP growth rate and military expenditure to illustrate the changes in relative
power between the US, the Soviet Union/Russia, and China.
1980s–1990s: Bipolar and Defensive National Interest
In the initial stages of the Cold War, the US relied on its material power to maintain a
strategic advantage over the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). However, the
power gap between the two great powers rapidly narrowed as the USSR caught up in
terms of strategic nuclear weapons, and the US became trapped in the Vietnam War. By
the 1970s, the US had gradually lost its dominant position within this power competi-
tion. The narrowing gap between the US and the USSR was particularly apparent in the
realm of military expenditure during the 1980s. According to Figure 6, in 1985, military
expenditure was almost equal between the US (USD 258.165 billion) and the USSR
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(USD 225.01 billion). It is easy to see that China was a relatively weak power compared
with the US and USSR at this stage (see Figures 5 and 6). In terms of GDP, China’s grew
from USD 0.191 trillion to 0.309 trillion between 1980 and 1985, but the gap in eco-
nomic strength relative to the US (USD 4.373 trillion) and USSR (USD 0.941 trillion)
remained huge. From a military expenditure perspective, although data on China’s were
not released in the 1980s, the figure in 1990 reached only USD 10 billion – indicating a
large gap in military strength compared with the US and USSR.
The systemic stimuli in this period were produced by the changing defensive/
offensive strategic posturing between the US and the USSR. Its growing military power
drove the USSR to become increasingly aggressive in its foreign behaviour and an
increasing threat to China’s national security, which was mainly demonstrated in ideo-
logical debates and territorial conflicts – leading to the complete breakdown of the Sino–
USSR alliance. Under such circumstances, how to effectively withstand the USSR’s
aggressive expansion became a common interest of China and the US and led to a
strategic rapprochement in Sino–US relations.
Essentially, allying with the US to counterbalance the USSR was an opportunity for
China to achieve autonomy within a bipolar international system, enabling the Chinese
government to transform its foreign policy to prepare for the forthcoming US–China–
USSR strategic triangular relationship (Dittmer, 1981). In response to the change in the
international power structure, Deng proposed that China pursue an independent foreign
policy of non-alliance – emphasising that the Asian country would play neither the “US
Card” nor the “Soviet Card” (Deng, 2008: 56–57). Deng’s proposal was indicative of a
shift in the Chinese government’s rapprochement strategy towards a balance of power, so
as to manage the US–China–USSR strategic triad.
The formation of this strategic triangle within the international power structure was a
powerful systemic stimulus to China’s foreign policy. Other than allowing the Chinese
government to break away from the dilemma of isolated diplomacy created by the anti-
two hegemons strategy of the Maoist era and receiving the US’s financial, technological,
and military support, a more important stimulus was that from adopting a balance of
power strategy. Hereby, China could maintain its strategic flexibility in dealing with the
two hegemons and avoid being passively “installed” in the strategic triangle – enabling
the government to maintain a relatively neutral but ultimately pro-US position, which
provided a broader space for China’s strategic choices.
By maintaining strategic flexibility between the US and the USSR, the Chinese gov-
ernment relieved itself of “revolutionary diplomacy” (Armstrong, 1977: 1–12), allowing
the country to shift its strategy from a conflict to a co-operation model. Three major
changes proved such a shift took place. First, the primary task shifted from “class
struggle as the guiding principle” to “economic construction as central.” This indicates
that China’s policy orientation was increasingly based on rational calculations rather
than ideological considerations. Second, following the transition in policy orientation,
the importance of ideology in foreign policy weakened significantly, turning from
“revolutionary diplomacy” to “developmental diplomacy.” Third, the Chinese lead-
ership no longer assessed the world as one of war, but one in which peace and
development were the two major themes of the contemporary era.
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The changes shown above reflect China’s willingness to compromise on its defence
of ideology and to engage with other countries in a more co-operative way. This view
can be illustrated from both domestic and international perspectives. Domestically, after
safeguarding national security, Deng established economic construction as the central
policy at the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1982 – thereby
prioritising economic interests over other goals. Deng then reiterated in several important
speeches that economic construction and modernisation were the most crucial pre-
conditions for China in dealing with international and domestic affairs (Deng, 2008:
163–178, 204).
Internationally, such prioritisation enabled China to strengthen economic co-operation
with the US, Japan, and other Western countries, which it did mainly because the market
resources, advanced technology, managerial experience, and foreign investment pro-
vided by the international economic order were essential to the country’s development
and modernisation (Sutter, 2012: 74). To develop a closer network with developed
countries, China changed its role from that of a self-sufficient socialist country to a
participant in international institutions. For example, China joined the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) and thereafter participated in a United
Nations negotiating conference – endorsing a series of documents and agreements on
disarmament and arms control.
Given the normalisation of Sino–US relations and China’s co-operative strategy, the
stance of surrounding countries also shifted to accommodation. These responses were
mainly seen in the following important geopolitical relations: Sino–Soviet, Sino–Japanese,
and Sino–Mongolian. To contain the Asian country’s rising autonomy within the strategic
triangle, then president Ronald W. Reagan pursued a “dual-track” policy towards China
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Figure 7. Changes in scope over different time periods. Source: Author’s own compilation.
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and Taiwan – putting the brakes on the process of strategic rapprochement between China
and the US. The deceleration of Sino–US rapprochement opened up space for Sino–Soviet
relations. In 1982, the Chinese government engaged in funeral diplomacy to set up a high-
level visit, breaking a political impasse that had existed since the 1960s. In response to this
ice-breaking effort, Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a speech in Vladivostok expressing
Soviet willingness to improve relations with China and agreeing to remove the “Three
Obstacles.” Gorbachev then visited Beijing in 1989, where the Soviet and Chinese lead-
ership issued a joint declaration officially recognising the rapprochement between the two
socialist countries.
Driven by the improvement in Sino–Soviet relations, the Mongolian government
also revealed a willingness to pursue accommodation with China. For example, the
two governments reached an agreement on joint inspections of the Sino–Mongolian
border, defining it as a friendly and peaceful border in 1984. Sino–Mongolian
relations deepened in 1986 with the signing of a trade agreement, which led to
substantial improvement in bilateral relations. Sino–Japanese relations also made
great progress. Politically, the Chinese and Japanese governments established the
four principles of Sino–Japanese relations and formed the Sino–Japanese Friendship
Committee for the twenty-first century as an advisory agency of the two govern-
ments (Howe, 1996). Economically, the Japanese government and national bank
agreed to provide three Japanese yen loans and two resource loans to China. At the
same time, the Sino–Japanese trade volume reached USD 189 billion – with Japan
surpassing the US to become China’s second-largest trading partner. In this regard,
the accommodating responses from the surrounding countries definitely exerted a
positive effect on China’s strategic choices, which was helpful for the government
in shaping a relatively favourable external environment so as to serve its domestic
development.
Based on the aforementioned discussion, it is observable that under the covariation
of these three variables, China’s national interest at this stage of development had a
strong internal orientation, mainly focusing on domestic needs and serving economic
growth. Such attributes of China’s national interest are consistent with the definition
of “defensive national interest.” More precisely, the logic of the formulation of
defensive national interest is as follows: the vacuum created by the relaxation of the
power struggle between the US and the USSR enabled China to increase its strategic
autonomy, pushing the international power structure towards one of strategic trian-
gular relations. This systemic stimulus not only helped the Chinese government to
alleviate the great security threat from the USSR but also made China abandon
ideologically driven revolutionary diplomacy, with it turning instead to a more
rational and interest-based co-operative approach in dealing with other countries.
Relying on the national interest, the Chinese government adjusted its foreign policy
from a conflictual to a developmental orientation. China’s co-operative strategic
choice reinforced the systemic stimulus signalled by the change in the power
structure and caused wide-ranging effects on its peripheries. The accommodative
responses of the surrounding countries, as the second intervening variable, were
helpful for the Chinese government to shape a favourable external environment –
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which, as noted, strengthened China’s internal orientation. In this regard, the Chinese
government required all other internal and external affairs to serve domestic devel-
opment so as to formulate the defensive national interest – limiting the scope of
China’s national interest at the domestic level.
1991–2010: The Unipolar System and Constructive National
Interest
From 1991 to 2010, the systemic stimulus was mainly derived from two perspectives:
first, the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War was the most significant
change in the international power structure of the early 1990s, resulting in a US-led
unipolar system. Second, as a secondary great power, China earned its opportunity to
accumulate power resources, raising its position within the international system so as to
fill the power vacuum left by the USSR. Between 1990 and 2010, China’s GDP
increased from USD 0.36 to 6.101 trillion, surpassing Japan to become the world’s
second-largest economy in 2010 (see Figure 5 above). This economic development
helped China convert resources into military capability. China’s military expenditure
increased nearly elevenfold in 20 years, reaching USD 115.712 billion in 2010 (see
Figure 6 above).
Following this logic, the Chinese government should have had increasing space for
choosing its preferred foreign policy. However, China’s rising power position first
encountered the US’s hegemonic maintenance strategy, which has been a solid, con-
tinuous approach from the end of the Cold War to the present. As Brzezinski (1997:
48–56) suggested, the US – as a new type of global hegemonic power – should adopt
an appropriate geopolitical strategy, indicating that the government in Washington
needs to prevent and contain the potential challenger from rising within the Eurasia
chessboard. China, the key geostrategic player, was particularly highlighted by
Brzezinski, indicating the US’s special attention paid to it. Therefore, China’s rise and
the US’s hegemonic position would become the new structural confrontation in the
post-Cold War era – leading the Asian country to inevitably be contained by its North
American counterpart. Other than the structural pressure from the existing hegemonic
power, China – with its rapidly growing relative material capabilities – also triggered
wide-ranging anxiety in other countries, particularly on its peripheries. The Chinese
government thus had to pay more attention to relieving the fears of its neighbours
about its rise to global power.
While confronting the dual constraints imposed by the hegemonic power and sur-
rounding countries, China realised that simply displaying its willingness to co-operate
was not enough to comfort others. The co-operation model was primarily serving its
domestic needs, rather than signalling China’s real intentions to other state actors. To
reduce suspicion and fear on the part of the US and peripheral countries, the Chinese
government shifted its strategic choice from co-operation to the reassurance model by
establishing keep a low profile as a basic principle of foreign policy. This manifested in
two main ways: (1) towards hegemonic powers, China illustrated its strong desire to be
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engaged or involved in the US-led liberal international order; (2) towards surrounding
countries, China chose to offer more comprehensive reassurance.
In interacting with the US, the Chinese government chose to be consistent with that
country’s China policy, broadly defined as its engagement strategy – which aimed at
peacefully evolving the socialist country into a capitalist one by deepening China’s
involvement in international institutions. More precisely, in addition to joining the IMF
and WB China also successfully earned membership of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 2001. China’s participation in the WTO was widely considered an important
signal that the government wanted to pursue a more open market economy approach.
Moreover, China’s integration in international institutions dramatically increased – going
from being involved in 30 to 50 between 1986 and the year 2000 (Johnston, 2008: 33–
34). In 2006, China’s participation rate in international institutions had reach 60 per cent,
ranking it twelfth among all countries worldwide. This increasing trend led Washington
to re-evaluate the efficacy of its engagement strategy. In addition, the reassurance model
further strengthened China’s concession of avoiding direct conflict with the hegemonic
power. For example, the Chinese government demonstrated its great strategic patience
and self-restriction during the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the
2001 EP-3 incident (He, 2009).
The Chinese government has prioritised its relations with neighbouring countries and
adopted an increasingly comprehensive reassurance strategy towards them since 2001.
For example, in that year then Chinese premier Zhu Rongji proposed that China and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should establish a “free trade area”
within 10 years – which was warmly welcomed by the latter. In 2002, China and
ASEAN reached an endorsement of the “Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Co-operation” and officially activated the process towards the “China-
ASEAN Free Trade Zone.” Stimulated by these agreements, the value of trade
between China and ASEAN reached USD 78.2 billion in 2003 – realising some 42.9 per
cent growth, which made ASEAN China’s fifth-largest trade partner. In 2009, the
bilateral value of Sino–ASEAN trade had grown to USD 213 billion – up from USD
7.95 billion in 1991. Similarly, China also actively participated in the creation of the
China–Japan–South Korea and ASEAN (10þ3) framework, broadening the scope of
co-operation from economic issues in the initial stage to political, social, and security
issues (Wong, 2007). By adopting the reassurance model to reach a relative balance
between the hegemonic power and neighbouring middle and small powers, China’s
strategy at this stage of its development significantly alleviated concerns among
Southeast Asian countries about the “China threat.”
Although China would take a reassurance model-based approach to the existing
hegemonic power and its peripheries so as to convince them of the country’s peaceful
rise, the surrounding countries – based on interest-maximisation calculations – still
chose to employ hedging as their major strategy. This response was mainly demon-
strated by the three great powers: Russia, Japan, and India. As discussed above, Sino–
Russian relations were a typical illustration of how great powers co-operate with one
another. More specifically, the Chinese government immediately recognised the new
Russian government – creating a “non-confrontation, no alliance, no targeting of a
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third country” partnership – and they also handled sensitive border disputes through
political agreements.
Sino–Japanese relations, meanwhile, were a typical illustration of the hedging strat-
egy. Although the Japanese government adopted a co-operative approach as a different
way to address China’s international isolation, leading to smoother relations in terms of
high-level visits, trade, and loans, the economic gap between Japan and China became
increasingly apparent – encouraging Japan to turn towards a hedging strategy. During the
mid-1990s, to contain the rapid rise of China, the Japanese government decided to
strengthen security and military relations with the US by upgrading the US–Japan
alliance. The redefinition of this alliance further complicated China’s own surrounding
environment and increased the potential for the entrapment of it, Japan, and the US in a
security dilemma in the East Asia region – thereby weakening co-operation between
China and Japan in the early 1990s. Similarly, while China and India reached several
agreements to peacefully resolve boundary disputes in the 1990s, New Delhi adopted a
nuclear strategy to enable it to compete for power within the region. This helped
maintain its hegemonic position on the South Asian subcontinent and led to it con-
fronting the rise of China. By advocating the China threat theory, the Indian government
legitimised its pursuit of nuclear weapons – which both undermined Sino–Indian rela-
tions and posed a security threat to the southern part of China.
Relying on previous discussions, we are able to assert that the covariation effect of
these three variables drove China’s national interest from an internal orientation to a mixed
orientation. This means that China’s national interest had to achieve a balance between
domestic needs and external pressures. This accords with the definition of “constructive
national interest.” More specifically, the logic of the formulation of constructive national
interest is as follows: the emergence of a unipolar system and China’s rising power
position within it were the two major systemic stimuli at this stage. While the collapse of
the USSR opened up space for China to fill this power vacuum, the latter’s rise was first
contained by the US because Washington wanted to prevent any potential challengers
emerging so that it could maintain its hegemonic position as long as possible. Besides,
China’s rising position also caused widespread anxiety and fear on its peripheries.
In the context of such systemic stimuli, China’s strategic choice transitioned from the
co-operation to the reassurance model, seeking to pacify the neighbouring states; the co-
operation model merely served the country’s internal affairs and failed to demonstrate
China’s real intentions. By proactively engaging in the US-led liberal international order
and participating in regional integration, the Chinese government tried to signal its ben-
evolent intentions and to demonstrate that the country in its rise shared common interests
with international society – rather than it challenging the existing order. Driven by the
former two variables – China’s strategic choice and the response from surrounding states,
the neighbouring countries did not form an anti-China alliance – helping China avoid the
worst-case scenario. However, these countries – based on rational calculations – adopted a
hedging strategy to maximise their own interests, which reinforced China’s mixed strategic
orientation. To maintain the image of constructor, China was compelled to turn its
defensive national interest into a constructive national interest and expand its scope from
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the domestic level to the intra-regional one. Hereby it engaged with its own interests and
shared its increasing dividends with others to demonstrate its benevolent intentions.
2011–2017: The Trend Towards Multipolarity and China’s
Adversary Core Interest
The systemic stimulus in this third stage of development was the relative power tran-
sition between the US and China. In 2008–2009, the US suffered a twin loss of relative
capability and strategic credibility owing to the global financial crisis, whereas China
represented itself as a newly confident and strong great power by showing its
responsible attitude in handling the negative impacts witnessed in the post-crisis
period. According to Figures 5 and 6, China’s GDP doubled from USD 6.101 to
12.238 trillion between 2010 and 2017, reaching approximately 60 per cent of the US’s
own GDP and formally inducing a power transition. China’s military expenditure grew
from USD 115.712 to 228.231 billion between 2010 and 2017, reaching one-third of
the US amount. This transition enabled China to fill the power vacuum in the Asia-
Pacific region left by the US.
However, the relative power transition between the two great powers does not mean
that the US has handed its hegemonic position to China. Rather, by reclaiming US global
leadership in the report named Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense (2012), the Obama administration presented a solid stance for pro-
tecting hegemony, resulting in increasing structural conflict between the US and China.
The potential conflict caused by the US’s unshakable determination to maintain hege-
mony and China’s rising capability and expanding international influence has led some
scholars to conclude that it is forcing the former to adopt a multifaceted approach to
diplomacy so as to address the all-around rise of the latter (Friedberg, 2012).
The “rebalance strategy” proposed by the Obama administration was the first sig-
nificant strategic reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold
War. Its purpose was to regain the hegemonic position in the region by reinforcing
military alliances with the US’s partners and initiating a new round of military
deployment (Blackwill and Tellis, 2014: 18–22). In line with the important speech
“America’s Pacific Century” delivered by Hillary Clinton in 2011, we can summarise
that Obama’s rebalance strategy mainly constituted political, security, and economic
perspectives (Clinton, 2011). First, from the political perspective, the Obama adminis-
tration paid more attention to “advanced diplomacy,” aiming at enhancing the US’s
regional influence on China’s peripheral countries by sending there high-level officials,
experts, and staff from transnational organisations. Hillary Clinton’s visit to Myanmar in
2011 was the most typical case of advanced diplomacy.
Second, from the security perspective, Washington strengthened security relations
with traditional and non-traditional partners, attempting to upgrade alliances from
bilateral to multilateral ones. For instance, by upgrading the US–Japan alliance that East
Asian country was promoted to the second axis – constructing a multilateral strategic
partnership with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Third, from the economic per-
spective, the USA launched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), regarded as the top free
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trade agreement in the twenty-first century – being designed to integrate the economic
resources of the Asia-Pacific region into a US-led economic co-operation mechanism.
More importantly, the TPP deliberately excluded China – indicating that Washington
intended to isolate the rising power from regional economic integration and slow down
its rapidly expanding regional influence.
Under this systemic stimulus, China had to maintain a strategy of reassurance towards
its periphery. On the one hand, fear and anxiety were positively correlated with China’s
rising power status; on the other, the Chinese government needed to resolve the acute
strategic pressure being generated by the US. This meant that China would be obliged to
mix reassurance and balancing, rather than it choosing just one strategy. This mixed
strategy is hedging. The balancing conducted by the Chinese government is mainly
illustrated in its strategic reaction to the US’s containment, which includes two major
aspects: quasi-alliances and institution balancing. In terms of the first, Sino–Russian
relations were growing closer under increasing pressure from the US’s rebalancing
strategy. More specifically, Sino–Russian relations were first upgraded to a compre-
hensive strategic partnership in 2011; then, Xi and Russian president Vladimir Putin
agreed to define relations between the two great powers as a new stage in their com-
prehensive strategic partnership, in 2014. Thereafter, confronting simultaneous strategic
pressure exerted by the US’s allies in the Asia-Pacific region and by the expansion of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, these two great powers endorsed a declaration on
global strategic stability that was widely seen as a quasi-alliance between China and
Russia (Liu and Liu, 2017).
Institution balancing mainly concerns the competition between the US-led TPP and
the China-led “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership” (RCEP) (Ye, 2015).
Balancing is focused on the exclusiveness of the two institutions. First, the leaders of the
TPP and RCEP are mutually exclusive. Second, the members of the two international
institutions are also exclusive of each other. Specifically, five states in the TPP are non-
RCEP members; similarly, nine states in the RCEP are non-TPP members (Li, 2016:
188). Such exclusiveness between the two international institutions reflects the balancing
and competition in contemporary Sino–US relations, leading scholars to worry that the
RCEP and TPP might split the Asia-Pacific economic system.
Additionally, strategic reassurance is the other approach adopted by the Chinese
government in demonstrating its benevolent intentions. This is mainly seen in three
major initiatives: constructing a new type of great power relationship within and beyond
the Asia-Pacific region, promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and reshaping
relations with neighbours. Other than emphasising the new type of relationship with the
US, the Chinese government pays equal attention to the other major powers within its
region – including Russia, Japan, and India. The three levels of relations concluded,
ranked from low to high, are “non-conflict and non-confrontation,” “mutual respect,”
and “win-win cooperation” (Zeng and Breslin, 2016). More specifically, Sino–Russian
relations have attained the highest level, win-win co-operation, while Sino–Japanese
relations have merely maintained the status of non-conflict and non-confrontation. Sino–
Indian relations fall in-between those with Russia and Japan.
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The BRI is China’s most direct way of showing its willingness to provide reassur-
ance. In the north, based on the two countries’ all-weather strategic partnership, China
and Russia have expanded the functions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to
help firmly establish the regional economic co-operation mechanism, paving the way for
a Sino–Russian–Mongolian economic corridor. In the west, the founding of the China–
Pakistan economic corridor has become the main impetus for BRI’s westward move-
ment. In the southeast, President Xi has proposed a new good neighbour diplomacy
policy whereby China pursues amity, sincerity, mutual benefits, and inclusiveness – with
a commitment to advancing peace, stability, and development in the Asia-Pacific region
(Wu, 2016). For instance, both President Xi and Premier Li Keqiang visited the
countries to China’s southeast in 2013, signalling a clear message that it would con-
tinue to use its diplomatic, economic, and security resources to provide reassurance to
those countries who do not openly balance again its rise. In addition, to relieve
the tension caused by the maritime disputes between China and these countries, the
government intentionally facilitated a new formula called the “Code of Conduct in the
South China Sea” as a fundamental principle for dealing with these territorial disputes.
Although the Chinese government has maintained its strategic flexibility in dealing
with the US’s rebalancing strategy, the balancing responses of neighbouring states may
largely undermine China’s efforts at reassurance. China’s utilisation of the balancing
policy is mainly because most major state actors in the Asia-Pacific region are band-
wagoning or have informal security relations (e.g. Vietnam) with the US. They also
thought that the rise of China imposed a great security pressure on them, which explains
why these countries actively and positively responded to Obama’s rebalancing strategy
(Cha, 2016: 24–28; Ross, 2006).
More specifically, in the Yellow Sea (Northeast Asia), the foreign policy flip-flopping
of South Korea vividly illustrates its bandwagoning with the US. While Sino–South
Korean relations entered a honeymoon period during Park Geun-hye’s administration,
South Korea immediately altered its foreign policy orientation – accepting the deploy-
ment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system provided by the
US – when the new round of the Korean nuclear crisis broke out. From the Chinese point
of view, South Korea’s acceptance of THAAD weakened its own strategic deterrence
and was also a way of strengthening Washington’s overall efforts to counterbalance or
contain China (Swaine, 2017). In the East China Sea, intentional balancing can be seen
in Japanese foreign behaviour. For example, the pursuit of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
in 2012 first led Sino–Japanese relations into a downward spiral, reaching a historic
freezing point. Thereafter, the US and Japan upgraded their security alliance by way of
publishing a new version of the “US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines” in 2015,
expanding the scope of the US–Japan alliance from Japan’s main island to the global
context so as to restrict China’s growing regional influence.
In the South China Sea, Vietnam’s strategic response to the rise of China in recent
years has been “bidirectional balance.” On the one hand, the Vietnamese government
maintains close and friendly party relations with the CCP, which is useful for preserving
its political legitimacy at the domestic level and for deepening economic relations with
China at the state one. On the other, due to geopolitical proximity, the rapid resurgence
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of China has imposed great security pressure on Vietnam – leading that government to
seek security support from the US. By connecting militarily with the hegemonic power,
Vietnam has been able to adopt a more assertive posture in its maritime disputes with
China and to maintain the existing political landscape in the South China Sea (Liu and
Sun, 2015).
Relying on the above discussion, we find that under the covariation of the three
variables, China’s national interest has demonstrated strong external orientation. This has
required the Chinese government to resist containment from the hegemonic power and to
avoid the formation of an anti-China alliance. This attribute of China’s national interest
is consistent with the definition of “adversary core interest.” More specifically, the logic
of the formulation of adversary core interest is as follows: although the relative power
transition first happened during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, which helped China to
increase its regional influence, the US began to strengthen its containment strategy vis-à-
vis China. Under this systemic stimulus, the Chinese government has accordingly shifted
its strategy from a reassurance to a hedging model, attempting to alleviate a paradoxical
situation with a more flexible mix of reassurance and balancing. At the level of bal-
ancing, China has used the Sino–Russian quasi-alliance as a strategic basis and
manipulated the institutions of the international political economy (TPP versus RCEP) as
a means of pushing back against the US’s rebalancing strategy. At the level of reas-
surance, by constructing a new type of relationship with other major powers, imple-
menting the BRI’s initiative, and reshaping its good neighbour diplomacy, the Chinese
government has sought to reduce its periphery’s incentive to balance against the country.
However, alliances and increasing uncertainties drove China’s neighbouring countries
to follow the US’s lead – with them joining the rebalancing strategy and with several
territorial conflicts with China being triggered. These balancing behaviours not only
weakened the efficacy of China’s reassurance efforts but also compelled the Chinese
government to adopt assertive actions to protect its territorial integrity. The systemic
stimuli and the strategic interactions between China and its neighbouring countries
resulted in an increasing adversary core interest in China’s national interest and led to it
transforming into the national core interest. Given the increasing US–China power
competition within the international system, the scope of adversary core interest may be
no more than intra-regional – but will still expand to the inter-regional level.
Conclusion
Although this article has viewed the international power structure as still the most
important explanatory variable, the structural realist presumption – which largely ignores
the impact of the strategic reactions of great powers to the international power structure –
is too rigid. This rigidity leads structural realism to identify only a one-way pattern in its
analyses of foreign policy. In this regard, structural realism may not provide a convin-
cing explanation of the transition in China’s national interest. Relying on theoretical
revisions to neoclassical realism, this article defines the international power structure as
the independent variable and adds two intervening variables –China’s strategic choices
and the responses of neighbouring states – at the interstate level to construct an analytical
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framework that is used to examine that transition in China’s national interest. More
importantly, the impact of the power structure on a state’s foreign policy per this ana-
lytical framework is not merely one-way, but is rather bidirectional and reactive. In other
words, the transition in China’s national interest is a strategic reaction to changes in the
international power structure. In this vein, this neoclassical realism-based analytical
framework can be replicated in future studies.
The transition in China’s national interest has undergone three stages since the
beginning of the 1980s: defensive national interest, constructive national interest, and
adversary core interest. Influenced by the differing systemic stimuli, China’s strategic
choices, the responses of neighbouring states, as well as the scope of China’s national
interest have all accordingly expanded from the domestic to the intra-regional and inter-
regional levels (see Figure 7).
It is worth mentioning that adversary core interest does not mean that China actively
seeks to counter the existing hegemon; rather, it is a passive redefinition of the national
Table 1. The prediction of the established analytical framework.
International power
structure
China’s
strategic choice
Response from
neighbouring
states
The transition
of China’s
national
interest
The changing
scope of China’s
national interest
Bipolar system US–China–USSR
strategic triangle
Developmental
diplomacy
Accommodation Defensive
national
interest
Domestic level
Unipolar
system
International
isolation and the
early stage of
China’s rise
Strategic
reassurance
Hedging Constructive
national
interest
Intra-regional
level
The trend of
multipolar
system
China’s all-around
rise and
America’s
rebalancing
strategy
Mixture of co-
operation
and balancing
Alliance or
balance
Adversary
core
interest
Inter-regional
level
Prediction
Multipolar
system or
return to
bipolar
system
Continuing
strategic
pressure from
US and allies
Abandoning the
traditional
non-allied
strategy
Balance or
bandwagoning
Alliance
common
interest
Intra-alliance
level
Note: USSR ¼ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Source: Author’s own compilation.
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interest, an adaptation to changes in the international power structure. In other words,
while China might not have confrontational intentions, the narrowing gap between the
dominant states’ capabilities leads the US to seek to contain China’s rise – forcing that
government to fix different types of national interest as a strategic response. In particular,
“adversarial” does not imply offensiveness or aggressiveness in foreign behaviour. In
contrast, such an adversarial stance is a passive reaction to US containment.
If we use this analytical framework to predict the future development of China’s
national interest, several observations follow: growing containment pressure from the
US may lead the Chinese government to abandon the non-alliance principle, such that
states in the Asia-Pacific region will align with either China or the US (see Table 1).
Accordingly, adversary core interest may be transformed into alliances based on com-
mon interests. Taking Sino–Russian relations as an example, the tenor of them largely
depends on the strategic pressure that the US exerts. In other words, if the extent of it
goes beyond China’s limit, then the latter may discard with the conventional foreign
policy of non-alliance and upgrade the Sino–Russian quasi-alliance to a formal one. This
strategic transition may drive neighbouring states to choose between China–Russia and
the US.
Overall, given China’s and Russia’s powerful impact on international politics, the US
might not ultimately impose too much pressure on China – thereby keeping Sino–
Russian relations in a state of quasi-alliance. More importantly, to save on strategic costs,
Washington might seek to contain China by acting as an offshore balancer and by
passing the buck on its strategic obligations to its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. This
strategy is highly possible, particularly since Donald Trump came to power in 2017.
Therefore, China’s adversary core interest may last for a while yet before the Trump
administration increases strategic pressure on it and Russia.
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